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The relationship between government and people has long been the defining concern 
for much political enquiry. Considerable work in political theory has been devoted to 
addressing the proper limits of government authority, and the rights that citizens 
should have in relation to that authority. But important strands of normative political 
thought have also investigated the government-people relationship in terms of the 
duties and obligations owed to authority by citizens, and the conditions under which 
authority should be granted acceptance and even loyalty.1 This latter concern – the 
circumstances under which citizens accept governing authority as legitimate – also 
forms a persisting and central theme for empirical political enquiry. Indeed, this 
concern has been given renewed priority in recent times, both by the investigation of 
public attitudes to the new democratic regimes established across much of the world 
(Bratton et al 2004; Evans and Whitefield 1995), and because of perceptions of 
declining public legitimacy within many of the world’s more established democracies 
(Anderson and Guillory 1997; Dalton 2004; Norris 1999). 
 The practical implications of the degree of legitimacy granted to government 
authority by the public have long been disputed. Warren Miller, for one, is reputed to 
have contended that declining public trust in the political system was ‘the most 
dramatic trend in American public opinion…to have no apparent effect on citizen 
behaviour’ (cited in Dalton 2004: 157). But an accumulated body of international 
evidence now tends to the conclusion that public attitudes to a system of government 
do have important consequences. Lower levels of public endorsement have been 
found to be linked to specific behavioural consequences – such as lesser degrees of 
public compliance with taxation and census laws (Dalton 2004, ch.8; Kornberg and 
Clarke 1992; Schloz and Lubell 1998) – but also to be associated with greater citizen 
willingness to support radical institutional change (Cain et al 2003; Dalton et al 2001; 
Shugart and Wattenberg 2001), or to offer support to non-mainstream, and even 
violent, paths of political activity (Craig and Wald 1985; Muller and Seligson 1982). 
Put simply, the public legitimacy of a political structure is a fundamental pillar of its 
stability. As one recent study of the subject has observed: 
 
The weaker its legitimacy, the less a government can rely on the obedience or 
support of its subjects when it comes under stress… The stability of a political 
order could be modelled as a relation between the strength of its legitimacy 
and the force of the pressures to which it is exposed (Beetham and Lord: 1998: 
9-10). 
 
 In 1999, new governing institutions were created in two of the constituent 
nations of the United Kingdom, Scotland and Wales. The creation of the Scottish 
Parliament (SP), and the National Assembly for Wales (NAW) gave the two nations 
substantial political autonomy,2 and constituted one of the greatest constitutional 
upheavals in the three hundred year history of the United Kingdom. There has been 
considerable work conducted on numerous aspects of devolution.3 And yet, a decade 
                                               
1
 The duty owed to authority by citizens is perhaps most prominent in the work of Thomas Hobbes and 
John Locke, but is of course a central theme for many theorists. For important contemporary 
discussions of the legitimacy of political authority, see Pateman (1985), Horton (1992). 
2
 Anthony King has observed of Scottish devolution that “[t]here has probably never in any country 
been a greater voluntary handover of power by a national government to a subnational body within its 
own borders” (2007: 193). 
3
 An important collection of political science perspectives on devolution can be found in Jeffery and 
Wincott (2006). 
into this major constitutional experiment, we still know very little about its legitimacy 
with the people of Scotland and Wales and thus about an important pillar for the long-
term stability of this governing arrangement. 
 Our paper seeks to remedy this deficiency in our knowledge. It is structured as 
follows. First, we consider the concept of public legitimacy and its relevance to the 
assessment of devolved government in Scotland and Wales. Next, we explore in detail 
how public attitudes towards devolution have developed in the two nations, assessing 
the extent to which such attitudes have changed over the past decade and the degree to 
which self-government within the UK can now be regarded as having attained 
legitimacy with the public. Having explored this, we then move on to assess the 
factors that shape public attitudes. We outline two main alternative routes – the 
consequentialist and the deontological – towards legitimation; we then assess the 
extent to which variables associated with each help to explain public attitudes towards 
devolution. Finally, the conclusion considers the implications of the findings for 
understandings of public attitudes towards devolution in Scotland and Wales, and for 
the future stability of the governmental arrangements now in place in these two 
nations. 
 
 
Legitimacy and Devolution 
 
What is Public Legitimacy? The concept of legitimacy has been central to a great deal 
of political enquiry, but like many political concepts it has not acquired a settled 
meaning or clear referent. Rather, legitimacy has been understood in a variety of 
ways, and applied to a considerable range of political phenomena.4 To provide a clear 
focus to our study, it is important that we define precisely how we understand 
legitimacy, and for what purposes the concept will be applied. 
 First, our focus here is on public legitimacy. This means, quite simply, that our 
enquiry is concerned with the extent to which the mass publics of Scotland and Wales 
accord legitimacy to devolution. This is a different matter – and necessitates different 
methods of enquiry – from work that might explore the legitimacy accorded to 
political authority by some or other set of political, social or cultural elites. 
 Second, to distinguish between some important categories identified in the 
theoretical literature, we are concerned here with the normative legitimacy of 
particular structures of political authority, rather than their legal or formal legitimacy 
(Beetham and Lord 1998: 3-4). Put more simply, our focus here is on perceptions of 
the rightfulness of their (continued) existence, rather than on whether those structures 
have been established, or power within them is being wielded, in accord with certain 
proper procedures. 
 Third, in talking about the public legitimacy of devolution in Scotland and 
Wales we are concerned with attitudes towards devolution as a form of political 
regime (Dalton 2004; Easton 1965). As such, we are not concerned with the 
legitimacy of the political community (with the integrity of Scotland or Wales as 
recognised entities); nor are we concerned with the legitimacy of a particular set of 
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 It was Jurgen Habermas (1976) who famously posited the existence of a ‘legitimation crisis’ in 
modern societies. Clark (2005) provides an important application of the concept of legitimacy in 
modern international politics; Hurd (2007) consider legitimacy more specifically in the context of the 
United Nations Security Council. 
political authorities (a specific government).5 The political regime operates at a level 
between the community and the authorities: the term regime connotes, within a 
particular, self-defined community, the broad system and structures within and 
through which a particular set of political authorities wield political power. 
In short, we are concerned with legitimacy in the sense defined by Lipset 
(1959: 77): “the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the 
existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society”. To talk of 
the public legitimacy of devolution is to be concerned with whether a substantial 
proportion of people within Scotland and Wales do, in fact, have the sort of beliefs 
that Lipset outlined. To the extent that they do, this should be manifest in broad, 
reasonably deep-rooted, public acceptance of the basic structures of devolved 
government, rather than necessarily in the immediate or specific approval of current 
office-holders within the devolved institutions, or the policies that those individuals 
are currently pursuing. As Caldeira and Gibson aver, “[c]itizens may disagree with 
what an institution does but nevertheless continue to concede its authority as a 
political decision maker.” (1995: 357). 
 
Public Legitimacy and Devolved Government: During the early-to-mid 1990s there 
was some evidence of declining support for, and trust in, the political system across 
the UK (Clarke et al 2004: 293; Curtice and Jowell 1997). These negative trends in 
public attitudes helped underpin the agenda for constitutional change that was 
developed by the Labour party in opposition, and then largely implemented in 
government after the party’s victory in the UK general election in 1997. But particular 
problems were perceived to exist in Scotland and, to a lesser extent, Wales. 
For much of the eighteen years of Conservative rule from 1979-97, these two 
nations experienced rule by a government that enjoyed very limited public support but 
nonetheless proceeded with the implementation of some highly unpopular policies.6 
At least some members of the political class in Scotland and Wales began to talk of a 
‘democratic deficit’, as these largely non-Conservative nations were not having their 
political preferences reflected in the nature of the government that ruled over them.7 
In short, the legitimacy of the political regime was beginning to be challenged. 
                                               
5
 Dalton further distinguishes three aspects of support for a political regime: support for the Principles 
of the regime, support for the Norms and Procedures under which it operates, and support for the 
Institutions of the regime. However, he acknowledges that, in practice, “it is often difficult to draw 
such fine distinctions” (2004: 7). Our examination of the public legitimacy of devolution is primarily 
concerned with the third aspect here: the legitimacy of the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly 
for Wales as institutions through which substantial public authority is now being wielded. However, it 
also clearly incorporates elements of the first aspect as well: the legitimacy of the principle that 
Scotland and Wales should be partially self-governing entities within the UK state. 
6
 The Conservative party has for some years been appreciably less electorally successful in Scotland 
and Wales than in England. By the 1987 UK general election, the party won only 10 of 72 
parliamentary seats in Scotland, and 8 of 38 from Wales, despite retaining a substantial majority in 
England (357 of 523 seats). Shortly after the 1987 election, the Conservative UK government 
proceeded to introduce a poll tax/’Community Charge’ for local services; although this tax was deeply 
unpopular, it was actually introduced in Scotland a year earlier than in England and Wales. Earlier in 
the life of the 1979-1997 Conservative government, policies to raise interest rates to tackle inflation 
and to reduce public subsidies for publicly-owned heavy industries had hit areas of central Scotland 
and south Wales (where the overwhelming majority of the population of the respective nations live) 
particularly hard. 
7 For discussion of how perceptions of a ‘democratic deficit’ emerged, see Wright (1997) and Harvie 
and Jones (2001) on Scotland and Morgan and Mungham (2000) on Wales. 
The policy of devolution for Scotland and Wales was developed in the late-
1980s and early-1990s – or, to be more precise, revived after its failure in the 1970s8 – 
as a response to that challenge. In Scotland, the policy was developed through a 
broad-ranging movement that encompassed several political parties and a swathe of 
civic society organisations meeting in a Constitutional Convention (Lynch 1996). In 
Wales, by some contrast, the devolution proposals that were eventually enacted 
emerged through a process concentrated much more narrowly inside the hegemonic 
Labour party (Morgan and Mungham 2000).9 Devolution was an attempt to ‘square 
the circle’; very much in the tradition of Prime Minister Gladstone’s agenda for Irish 
Home Rule in the 19th century, and of regionalist reforms in other states,10 it sought to 
accommodate the concerns of minority nations by giving them partial autonomy 
through their own, elected institutions, while keeping them at the same time still 
firmly within the United Kingdom. 
 Public endorsement for the creation of a Scottish Parliament and National 
Assembly for Wales was given in referendums held in the two nations in September 
1997. But the strength of the endorsement given was strikingly different. In Scotland, 
the creation of the devolved legislature was supported by an almost three-to-one 
majority.11 In Wales, the margin of victory for those in favour of devolution was a 
mere 6,721 votes (0.6% of those cast).12 
These results would seem to indicate that, in 1997 at least, there was a far 
greater degree of support for the principle of devolution in Scotland than in Wales. 
But this is not necessarily the case. The referendums offered voters in Scotland and 
Wales the choice between greater self-government within the UK and the 
constitutional status quo of no devolution. These are not, however, the only 
conceivable constitutional options. Nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales have for 
many years advocated independence for their respective nations.13 Devolution 
constitutes essentially a middle course between the full self-government represented 
by independence, and the constitutional status quo ante. It is entirely possible that a 
substantial part of the ‘Yes’ vote in Scotland in 1997 comprised those preferring that 
                                               
8 A policy of devolution to Scotland and Wales – similar, though not identical to that actually carried 
out in the 1990s – had been advanced by the Labour government of the UK in the 1970s. This policy 
faced strong opposition in parliament, including from many members of the governing party. 
Referendums were held on March 1, 1979, in both nations. In Scotland, devolution won the support of 
a narrow majority (51.6% voting in favour, 48.4% against); however, this majority was insufficient to 
clear a hurdle imposed by parliament – namely that, to be enacted, devolution needed also to win the 
support of 40% of the registered electorate. In Wales, devolution was rejected overwhelmingly by the 
people (20.3% voting in favour, compared to 79.7% against). 
9
 Paterson and Wyn Jones (1999) directly compare the different processes by which the devolution 
agenda was developed in Scotland and Wales. 
10
 For general discussions of developing programmes of regionalism across a number of states, see 
Dillinger (1994), Keating (1998). 
11
 The referendum, on 11th September 1997, saw 1,775,045 votes cast in favour of the creation of a 
Scottish Parliament (74.3% of the votes cast) and 614,000 votes cast against (25.7%). A second 
question was also asked in the referendum: whether the parliament should be granted ‘tax-varying 
powers’. This was also passed, with 1,512,889 votes in favour (63.5%) and 870,263 (36.5%) against.  
12
 In the Welsh referendum on 18th September 1997, 559,419 (or 50.3%) votes were cast in favour of 
the establishment of a Welsh Assembly, 552,698 (49.7%) were opposed. 
13
 Plaid Cymru for many years – until late 2003 – shied away from using the term ‘Independence’, 
while advocating ‘Full National Status for Wales’ as its ultimate goal. In practice, full national status as 
envisaged by Plaid had a high degree of functional equivalence with independence as the latter is 
generally understood. For a detailed examination of Plaid’s awkward relationship with the idea of 
‘independence’, see Wyn Jones (2007: ch.3). 
Scotland be governed as an independent state outside the UK, but who regarded 
devolution as an advance towards this ideal point. 
Moreover, whatever was the exact position at the time of the referendums, it is 
plausible to think that the landscape of public attitudes will have changed 
substantially over the following decade. One potential reason for change is 
disappointment. It is far from self-evident that devolution has been able to live up to 
the very high level of public expectations that had developed in Scotland and Wales 
by the late-1990s.14 Indeed, some of the most memorable events associated with the 
new devolved institutions have been failures: the enforced resignations of First 
Ministers in both Scotland and Wales;15 difficulties in achieving effective policy 
delivery in areas like health and education (Greer 2004; Greer and Rowland 2007; 
Rees 2005); and very public embarrassments surrounding the construction of 
permanent headquarters for the Parliament and the Assembly.16 
While some work has explored public attitudes to devolution in the years since 
its establishment (Curtice 2004, 2005, 2006; Wyn Jones and Scully 2003), there has 
been no sustained investigation of the public legitimacy of devolution. We thus know 
very little about the extent to which this major constitutional innovation has come to 
be accepted as the appropriate form of government by the people of Scotland and 
Wales. Is devolution legitimate? And, if so, from where does such legitimacy derive? 
The rest of the paper will address these questions. 
 
 
Measuring the Legitimacy of Devolution 
 
Institutions perceived to be legitimate are those with a widely accepted mandate 
to render judgments for a political community (Gibson et al 2003: 356). 
 
The notion of public legitimacy does not necessarily equate to any specific threshold 
of public support for a political regime. Nor has any specific threshold for notions like 
‘a widely accepted mandate’ been established in the comparative literature that 
explores the public legitimacy of political institutions.17 In order to address our 
question of whether devolution can be adjudged to have attained legitimacy with the 
people of Scotland and Wales, we propose to establish minimum criteria. We advance 
two: one negative and one positive. 
The negative criterion is that, to be adjudged as having a secure public 
legitimacy, a system of government should not face any substantial body of 
                                               
14
 On the high expectations of devolution in the late-1990s, see Surridge and McCrone (1999) on 
Scotland and Wyn Jones and Trystan (1999) on Wales. 
15
 In Wales, the original First Minister, Alun Michael of the Labour party, was forced to resign in 
February 2000; Michael had been faced with certain defeat in a No Confidence vote in the NAW, 
ostensibly on the issue of securing matching funds from the UK government to allow Wales to take full 
advantage of EU Objective 1 assistance, but in reality grounded in a widespread lack of confidence in 
Michael’s abilities. In Scotland, Henry McLeish (also of the Labour party, who became First Minister 
in 2000 after the sudden death of Donald Dewar) was forced to resign in November 2001 over the 
mishandling of expenses claims by his office.  
16
 The construction of a permanent building for the Scottish Parliament, in particular, proved the source 
of considerable public disquiet. The building, originally scheduled for completion in 2001 at a cost of 
£40m, was eventually opened in 2004 at a final estimated cost of over £400m (White and Sidhu 2005). 
17
 The absence of an established threshold for the legitimacy of institutions reflects, in part, the 
emphasis of most work on legitimacy being a variable quantity – institutions are judged to be more or 
less legitimate, rather than legitimate ‘yes or no?’. But it also reflects the difficulty of comparing 
attitudes towards different institutions, often measured at different times, using different methods. 
opposition that goes as far as to regard the authority of such government structures as 
wholly and irredeemably unacceptable. This criterion is far from merely hypothetical: 
the authority of government in much of the world is challenged by substantial sections 
of the populations over which those governments aspire to exercise authority. Such 
political movements can go beyond challenging specific actions of governments, and 
contest the very basis on which the political community or the political regime is 
constructed. Such a situation prevailed for much of the 20th century in part of the UK 
– namely Northern Ireland. There, a system of devolved government within the UK 
operated for several decades in the face of absolute opposition from a significant 
minority of the population of Northern Ireland, which refused to accept the legitimacy 
of such a form of governance.18 But judged on this criterion, the legitimacy of 
devolution does not currently face any significant challenge in either Scotland or 
Wales. There are no well-organised groups pursuing the abolition of devolution, no 
major political parties in either nation that remain fundamentally opposed to 
devolution, and no campaigns of resistance (whether armed or passive) to the 
authority of the Scottish Parliament or the Welsh Assembly.19 
The positive criterion we advance is that it would be difficult to regard a 
political regime as enjoying public legitimacy if it did not command the support of at 
least a bare majority of citizens. The ‘fifty percent-plus-one’ threshold is the 
minimum consistent with regarding an institution or system of government as 
possessing a ‘widely accepted mandate’. 
To apply this latter criterion to the devolved institutions in Scotland and 
Wales, we draw on evidence from a series of surveys conducted in both countries 
between 1997 and 2007. All these surveys have included a common question that 
enquires directly into respondents’ most preferred form of government for their 
nation. Four broad options are given: 
 
• Independence; 
• Remaining part of the UK, but with their own Parliament, with substantial 
law-making and some tax powers; 
• Remaining part of the UK, with a devolved Assembly having only limited 
law-making powers; and 
• No Devolution. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Findings from both Scotland and Wales for 1997-2007 are presented in Table 
1. The results show support for abolishing devolution and returning to the status quo 
ante to have remained distinctly limited in Scotland. Although the numbers endorsing 
this option have at no point been wholly negligible, and indeed experienced 
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 Opposition to the Stormont administration in Northern Ireland came overwhelmingly from the 
minority Catholic population. In Dalton’s terminology, this was grounded principally in opposition to 
how the boundaries of the political community had been drawn, rather than principled opposition to the 
political regime. However, civil rights movements that developed in the 1960s also drew attention to 
fundamentally discriminatory aspects of the manner in which the political regime operated (Tonge 
2002). 
19
 In the 2007 elections to the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales, the only remotely 
substantial political party which campaigned on a platform of fundamental opposition to devolution 
was the United Kingdom Independence Party. The party gained 4.0% of the regional list vote in Wales, 
and only 0.4% in Scotland, and won no seats in either institution. 
something of a short-term rise around 2004 (when negative publicity surrounding the 
delays and spiralling costs of the new Scottish Parliament building was at its height), 
the proportion favouring this option has never reached even one-in-five. However, 
this does not mean that the numbers endorsing devolution within the UK constitute a 
secure majority in Scotland. This is because a substantial proportion of respondents 
support taking self-government for Scotland as far as full Independence. Support for 
Independence has always been above one-quarter of respondents (except in 2007), 
and sometimes approaches forty per cent. When combined with the rather smaller 
numbers of people in Scotland wishing to abolish devolution altogether, this means 
that the proportion of respondents favouring some form of devolution (those choosing 
either the Assembly or the Parliament option) is below fifty percent in several years. 
On the positive criterion set out above, we cannot say that the public legitimacy of 
devolution as a form of government is necessarily securely established in Scotland. 
 The figures for Wales look rather different to those in Scotland, in at least two 
respects. First, and most perhaps obviously, support for Independence is much more 
limited in Wales than in Scotland. In none of the years for which we have data does 
the proportion of respondents choosing this constitutional option reach even fifteen 
percent. The second difference with Scotland is that the data for Wales show some 
very clear – indeed, monotonic – trends. These trends do not concern the numbers 
supporting the Assembly option, which have experienced no more than trend-less 
fluctuation. But the number of people supporting a return to the status quo ante of No 
Devolution has fallen substantially. From receiving the support of a clear plurality of 
nearly forty per cent in 1997, the proportion choosing this option declined to well 
below one-in-five respondents a decade later. And, in sharp contrast, the number of 
respondents preferring the Parliament option has grown steadily, to well above two-
in-five in the most recent data. In consequence, the overall level of support for 
devolution (the Assembly and Parliament options combined) has been comfortably 
above fifty percent in all surveys from 1999 onwards, with support reaching over 
seventy percent by 2007. Thus, notwithstanding the much stronger public 
endorsement given to devolution in Scotland in the 1997 referendums, in more recent 
years – at least according to the positive criterion we advanced earlier – the public 
legitimacy of devolution has actually been greater in Wales. 
 To summarise, the evidence from this section has suggested two conclusions 
for the legitimacy of devolution. In relation to the negative criterion of legitimacy we 
proposed, it is clear that devolution faces no little or no absolutist opposition in either 
Scotland or Wales. In relation to the positive criterion specified, the picture is a little 
more complex. There have been substantial, and largely consistent, levels of support 
for self-government in Scotland over the past decade. But the legitimacy of devolution 
faces a significant challenge from the alternative of independence. In Wales, support 
for self-government has increased considerably in the last ten years. With no tide of 
support for independence, the legitimacy of devolution here has become quite 
securely established. 
 
 
Alternative Sources of Public Legitimacy 
 
The previous section of the paper showed the evolution of public attitudes towards 
devolution over the last decade in Scotland and Wales, and assessed this evidence in 
relation to a specified criterion for evaluating the public legitimacy of devolution. 
What we did not do was attempt to explain public attitudes – to consider, to the extent 
that people do accord legitimacy to devolution, on what basis they might do so. This 
latter question is what we now address. 
Public attitudes to a political regime, such as that of devolved government 
within Scotland and Wales, might potentially be shaped by an infinite number of 
individual influences. However, drawing on the extant empirical literature on the 
legitimacy of political regimes, and in particular on work on the justifications offered 
for devolution in the UK, it is possible to specify some plausible hypotheses regarding 
systematic sources of influence on public attitudes. We divide these potential sources 
into two broad types: the consequentialist and the deontological. 
 
Consequentialist Influences on Public Attitudes: A first plausible set of influences on 
public attitudes to devolution in Scotland and Wales is what Kay’s theoretical analysis 
of justifications for Welsh devolution terms Consequentialism: the notion that 
devolution, if it is to be valued, is to be “desired on the grounds that it is believed to 
have good or desirable effects” (2003: 51).20 The emphasis here is very much on the 
practical consequences of this constitutional innovation: what difference having a 
Scottish Parliament or National Assembly for Wales has had, or might have.21 
There is little doubt that citizens’ attitudes to political institutions can be 
shaped in a consequentialist manner. A much-celebrated example is the experience of 
the Federal Republic of Germany in the years after World War II, where the success 
of the newly-established democratic polity in delivering prosperity along with 
political and social stability generated a broader public support for the institutions and 
principles of the Federal Republic (Boynton and Loewenberg 1973; Baker et al 1981). 
In David Easton’s (1965) widely-borrowed terminology, specific support for the 
successful policies of the West German government appeared to generate diffuse 
support for the broader political regime. 
There are also good reasons for believing that such factors should be important 
in explaining public attitudes to devolution. The 1997 referendum campaigns 
accorded great priority to consequentialist arguments. The ruling Labour party, in 
particular, sought very much to underplay any suggestion that devolution should be 
justified as a measure of national recognition for Scotland or Wales. Rather, the 
emphasis was placed much more on the practical consequences. In Wales, for 
instance, “the stated purpose of devolution was to produce better government rather 
than, say, give ‘proper’ constitutional recognition to Welsh nationhood” (Wyn Jones 
2001: 37). 
The practical consequences of devolution can, in turn, be divided into two 
categories: material and non-material. The material consequences of devolution 
concern their impact on public welfare and the effective delivery of government 
policies. The comparative literature remains somewhat inconclusive about the extent 
to which perceptions of effective policy delivery are an essential ingredient for diffuse 
public support for political institutions to develop (e.g. Dalton 2004, ch.3). But even if 
not a necessary condition, it remains a strong possibility. Detailed research on 
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 We should note that Kay (2003) is himself very dubious that consequentialist reasoning could 
provide an adequate or convincing justification for devolution.  
21
 To the extent that consequentialist influences are important in shaping public attitudes, they may 
function either retrospectively – citizens coming to support political arrangements like devolution 
because of the practical benefits that it has delivered – or prospectively – where attitudes are shaped by 
expected benefits in the future. However, as no adequate measures of prospective evaluations are 
available in our data, our empirical analysis will concentrate on exploring the impact of retrospective 
evaluations. 
Scottish voting behaviour in the 1997 referendum has argued that expectations of 
effective policy delivery were far more powerful factors in driving the victory of 
devolution than were, for instance, matters relating to Scottish national sentiment: 
“people supported a Parliament because they believed that it would improve the 
quality of public welfare in Scotland” (Brown et al 1999: 122). Given this 
background, there is at the very least a strong prima facie case to expect material 
consequentialism to be a significant influence in shaping public attitudes to devolved 
government. 
 However, the consequences of devolution are not necessarily limited to 
material ones. Kay’s (2003) articulation of consequentialism also points to potential 
non-material effects. The introduction of new structures of government for Scotland 
and Wales may well have come to be associated in the public mind with specific 
policy consequences. But it is also highly plausible that many citizens perceive 
devolution to have had an impact, for better or worse, on the process and practices of 
government: how, and by whom, the Scots and Welsh are governed. ‘How’ themes 
were, indeed, explicitly highlighted in Scotland and Wales in the 1990s, where 
devolution was linked with the idea of a ‘New Politics’. Advocates of devolution 
proposed a model of how politics was to operate in the new, devolved institutions that 
was deliberately contrasted with how politics was alleged to be practiced at 
Westminster. The New Politics of devolution, it was suggested, would not merely 
bring government physically closer to the people of Scotland and Wales, but would 
also make political life more ‘open’, more ‘inclusive’ and less confrontational (e.g. 
Osmond 1998). There is considerable room for doubt as to whether these aspirations 
have been wholly realised (Chaney and Fevre 2001; Mitchell 2000). Nonetheless, 
they do suggest one plausible source of influence on public attitudes: public 
perceptions of the impact of devolution on the process of government and politics, 
aside from any material consequences that devolution may be perceived to have had. 
 A related, but still somewhat distinct potential source of influence on public 
attitudes is the fact that devolution has served to bridge the democratic deficit alleged 
to have been opened up during the pre-devolution era of Conservative government. 
Executive office in the Scottish Government, and the Welsh Assembly Government, 
has at all times been in the hands of political parties commanding a much more 
substantial electoral mandate than the Conservatives managed in the late-1980s or 
1990.22 Aside from its material consequences, or its impact on how people are 
governed, devolution may have come to attract public support simply because it has 
provided Scotland and Wales with governments more attuned to their partisan and 
political sensibilities than those which prevailed in preceding years. 
 
Deontological Influences on Public Attitudes: While public attitudes to devolution 
may well be shaped by the material or non-material consequences it is perceived to 
have had, there are nonetheless good reasons to hypothesise that other types of 
influence could also be of considerable importance. Such has been the lesson of much 
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 Ministerial offices in the Scottish Government, as it is now termed (the Scottish Executive from 
1999-2007) were held during the 1999-2003 parliamentary term by a Labour-Liberal Democrat 
coalition which had won 73 of the 129 seats in the 1999 Scottish Parliament election; and during the 
2003-07 term by an identical coalition with 67 of the 129 seats. The current Scottish National Party 
minority administration holds 47 seats. For the majority of the first term of the Welsh Assembly, a 
Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition prevailed: this held 33 of the 60 seats. A single party Labour 
administration held power throughout the second term; Labour had won 30 seats in the 2003 election. 
The 2007 election eventually produced a Labour-Plaid Cymru coalition government, with 41 of the 60 
Assembly seats. 
of the body of comparative research conducted, which has found that “the 
satisfactions that members of a system feel they obtain from the perceived outputs and 
performance of the political authorities… is only indirectly relevant, if at all, to the 
input of support for the regime or political community” (Easton, 1975: 437). At the 
very least, it can often be the case that while specific support contributes to diffuse 
support, it is far from wholly accounting for it. And there are good reasons to believe 
that such has been the case in Scotland and Wales. In the most detailed examination 
of public reactions to devolution conducted hitherto, Curtice demonstrated that public 
preferences on how these nations should be governed were only modestly associated 
with consequentialist evaluations: 
 
Those who think that the [Scottish] Parliament or [Welsh] Assembly has not 
made any difference do not in fact hold very different views about the merits 
of devolution from those that do… at any one point in time support for the 
principle of devolution has not been closely related to perceptions of the 
performance of the devolved institutions (2005: 122). 
 
 An alternative approach to understanding the factors shaping public attitudes 
in Scotland and Wales is given by Kay’s notion of Deontological justifications for 
devolution. This, put simply, is the idea that devolution is not justified or valued 
primarily for its material consequences; instead, “devolution is thought to be 
inherently valuable” (2003: 51). As so defined, deontologism is the direct (indeed, 
tautologous) converse of consequentialism: virtue attached to devolution that does not 
arise from its consequences must, by definition, be innate. 
The clearest reason why the granting of partial self-government to Scotland 
and Wales could be regarded as having deontological virtue is that devolution offers 
political recognition, and substantial autonomy, to Scotland and Wales as nations. By 
raising their political standing at least to a similar level as that enjoyed by other 
prominent non-state nations (such as the Basques and Catalans in Spain), devolution 
may be fulfilling a valuable function in the eyes of many people. And the converse is 
also true: some may oppose devolution precisely because by giving political 
recognition to Scottishness and Welshness, it may appear to downplay the unifying 
importance of Britishness. In short, there is substantial scope for public attitudes to 
devolution to be shaped by the politics of national recognition. 
 
 
Explaining Public Attitudes to Devolution 
 
Our empirical analysis seeks to estimate the relationship between public attitudes to 
devolution in Scotland and Wales and a set of explanatory variables derived directly 
from the hypothesised sources of influence on public attitudes outlined above. The 
dependent variable for the analysis is responses to the Constitutional Preference 
question as set out in Table 1. The dependent variable therefore has four categories: 
No Devolution, Assembly, Parliament, and Independence. (Precise codings for the 
dependent variable, and all independent variables, are set out in Appendix 2). 
 Given that the dependent variable comes with a limited number of response 
categories, and no obvious interval-level relationship between those categories, OLS 
regression is not an appropriate functional form for our analysis. Nor, for our specific 
purposes here, is an ordered logit/probit model. The latter would appear potentially of 
use, as there is a clear ordering to the four categories of the dependent variable 
according to the extent of self-government they represent (from none at one end of the 
spectrum to full independence at the other). However, our concern here is specifically 
with support for devolution; we therefore need to be able to distinguish between 
support for the Assembly and Parliament options from endorsement either of No 
Devolution or Independence. Ordered model forms, which return a single set of 
coefficients for all response categories, do not readily permit this (O’Connell 2006). 
Our multivariate models for public attitudes in Scotland and Wales therefore deploy 
multinomial logistic regression (Long and Freese 2006). 
 Three broad categories of explanatory variable are used. The first category 
comprises several basic socio-demographic control variables: these specify the Age, 
Gender and (objectively measured) Social Class of respondents. Some of the very 
limited body of work examining public attitudes to devolution has suggested that 
these variables may be of explanatory importance (Wyn Jones and Scully 2003); they 
are therefore included as control variables, to avoid potential problems with omitted 
variable bias. 
The second category of explanatory variables we include comprises those that 
are specified in order to try to tap into consequentialist influences on public attitudes. 
In relation to material consequentialism, we specify three variables that measure the 
perceived impact of devolution on outcomes in three key areas of public policy: the 
management of healthcare provision, the effectiveness of education policy, and 
impact on the economic standard of living.23 But we also develop several variables 
directly linked to non-material consequentialism. First, we include two variables 
measuring respondents’ perceptions that devolution has had a beneficial impact on the 
process of government. These variables are derived from survey respondents’ replies 
to questions asking whether they believed devolution had ‘improved the way Britain 
as a whole is governed’ and whether it was ‘giving ordinary people more say in how 
Scotland/Wales is governed’.24 Second, to assess the hypothesis that individuals’ 
attitudes to devolution have been shaped by their sense that it has helped deliver 
government more in tune with their political preferences, we include a series of 
dummy variables for the partisan identification of respondents. If this hypothesis is 
well-founded, would expect support for devolution to be particularly high among 
identifiers with the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties, who held office in Scotland 
and Wales at the time that the survey data was gathered. 
The final category of explanatory variables specified is directly related to the 
deontological justification for devolution outlined above. To gauge the extent to 
which public attitudes towards devolution are shaped by the politics of national 
recognition, we include a series of dummy variables recording the national identity of 
respondents – measured on the now-standard ‘Moreno’ scale which allows for 
varying degrees of identification with Scotland/Wales and Britain. 
                                               
23
 There are potential problems with endogeneity in the relationship between constitutional preferences 
and our consequentialist variables. That is, while we specify policy evaluations as a variable potentially 
helping to explain constitutional preferences, it is plausible that the causal relationship may run at least 
partly in the other direction – i.e. that an individual’s views on how Scotland/Wales should be 
governed strongly condition how they evaluate the policy impact of devolution. We are unable, within 
our current modelling approach, to make empirical allowance for this problem. We can note, however, 
that it potentially inflates the impact of the consequentialist variables, and interpret the results 
accordingly. 
24
 As with our consequentialist variables, there are some potential problems of endogeneity in the 
relationship between public evaluations of the impact of devolution on the process of government and 
constitutional preferences. As with the consequentialist variables, we do not make any statistical 
adjustment for this factor, but do interpret the coefficients produced in light of this knowledge. 
 These independent variables are included in multinomial logistic regression 
models run separately for Scotland and Wales.25 (The reference category for the 
dependent variable is No Devolution.) Maximum likelihood estimates (with robust 
standard errors) are presented in Tables 2 and 3. These display parameters for each 
category of the dependent variable except the reference category: the parameters 
constitute the log odds of membership in category j compared to the reference 
category m. 
 
TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
 The results show that, notwithstanding the substantial differences in the 
landscape of public attitudes between the two nations, there are considerable 
commonalities between Scotland and Wales in terms of the variables most strongly 
associated with support for the differing constitutional options. In both Scotland and 
Wales, we find only a rather limited impact for the socio-demographic variables. In 
Scotland, female respondents are more supportive of the Parliament option, while 
there are some social class differences. Working class respondents are somewhat 
more likely to endorse Independence, while those in the generalised non-manual 
sector tend towards favouring only limited devolution. In Wales, there is a slightly 
stronger and more consistent pattern of younger respondents being significantly more 
supportive of self-government, and a modest association between membership of the 
Salariat and opposition to Independence. But the overall picture that emerges is that 
these socio-demographic variables contribute little either statistically or substantively 
to explaining public attitudes towards how Scotland and Wales should be governed.26 
 Second, it is very striking that the material consequentialist variables specified 
have little relationship with public attitudes. In Scotland, none of the variables attain 
statistical significance at the .05 level; moreover, the coefficient that comes closest to 
significance indicates an association between positive policy attributions on the 
economy and support for the Assembly option (i.e. support for more limited 
devolution!). There is a modestly significant and positive relationship between policy 
attributions on Education and support for the Parliament option in Wales. But positive 
policy attributions on the economic standard of living are actually associated – albeit 
again only modestly – with support for full Welsh Independence. There is certainly no 
strong and consistent relationship between perceptions of policy delivery and attitudes 
to devolution in either Scotland or Wales.27 
 A similarly modest impact on the dependent variable can also be observed for 
our deontological variables, the national identity dummies. National identity does help 
predict attitudes towards Independence: exclusively Scottish and Welsh identifiers are 
much more likely to endorse this constitutional option, while those proclaiming equal 
degrees of Scottish and British identity are significantly more likely to oppose it. But 
there are no significant relationships between any of the national identity variables 
                                               
25
 The multivariate analysis is conducted on data drawn from the 2003 surveys in Scotland and Wales. 
Limitations in the data available make it impossible to develop as fully-specified explanatory models 
for both Scotland and Wales in more recent years. 
26
 The modest impact of the socio-demographic variables is confirmed in models restricted to only 
these variables, which produce few significant coefficients and a very low model fit in both countries. 
27
 The weak association between the material consequentialist variables and public attitudes on how 
Scotland and Wales should be governed is not a function of colinearity between independent variables. 
The relationship remains weak even in a restricted model including only the socio-demographic and 
material consequentialist variables. 
and attitudes to devolution. Support for (and opposition to) devolution is not grounded 
primarily in the direct expression of the politics of national recognition. 
The results of the analysis suggest that constitutional preferences in Scotland 
and Wales are most satisfactorily explained by factors that we associated with non-
material consequentialism. Here again, the relationships observed are distinctly 
similar in the two countries. Conservative identifiers are strongly opposed to 
Independence, and Nationalist party identifiers strongly supportive of it, in both 
Scotland and Wales. But identification with the nationalist parties is also associated 
with support for devolution, despite these parties not having been in power at the time 
the data was collected. Nationalist identifiers almost uniformly support self-
government – and far from all of them, particularly in Wales, wish this to go as far as 
Independence. Supporters of the parties in power at the time of the survey – Labour 
and the Liberal Democrats – were more favourable to devolution in Wales, but only 
Labour identification was linked with support for a Parliament in Scotland. Thus, 
while party loyalties are linked with attitudes to devolution, that association is not 
necessarily based on loyalty to the parties that devolution has most directly 
empowered. 
 But by far the strongest degree of association with the dependent variable is 
found for those independent variables concerned with the impact of devolution on the 
process of government. Although the precise interpretation of this statistical 
relationship is complicated by the possibility of endogeneity – that pre-existing 
support for the principle of self-government partially shapes individuals’ responses 
towards these questions – the relationship is nonetheless very strong. 
 The substantive impact of this relationship can be more readily appreciated 
through the results presented in Table 4. These results, generated using CLARIFY 
software (King et al 200; Tomz et al 2003), translate the coefficients from our full 
multinomial logistic regression into predicted probabilities, across the full range of 
values of these two independent variables, of respondents in Scotland and Wales 
choosing one of the four constitutional options. Thus, an individual in Scotland 
thinking that devolution had made the way Britain is governed ‘a lot worse’ had 
approximately a 46% probability of selecting ‘No Devolution’ as their preferred 
constitutional option; a person thinking that devolution had made ‘no difference’ in 
this respect had a 9% probability of favouring No Devolution, and one thinking that 
devolution had made things ‘a lot better’ had only a 1% probability of opting for No 
Devolution. These substantive differences are even more striking in Wales. Those 
thinking that devolution had made the government of Britain ‘a lot worse’ had a 71% 
probability of favouring No Devolution, and only a 10% probability of choosing the 
Parliament option; those thinking that devolution had made things ‘a lot better’ in this 
respect had only a 2% probability of favouring No Devolution, and a 58% probability 
of favouring a full Parliament for Wales. Similarly, those thinking that devolution had 
‘given ordinary people more say’ in how Wales is governed had only a 9% probability 
of favouring No Devolution compared with a 33% probability for those believing that 
it it had given such people ‘less say’. 
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Those believing that partial self-government for Scotland and Wales has 
improved the system of government, and given ordinary people more say in how their 
particular nation is governed are much more likely than others to support some 
measure of self-government for Scotland and Wales. But such attitudes about the 
impact of devolution on the process of government do not necessarily equate to 
support for devolution. For some individuals, at least, they do. But for others, such 
perceptions appear to amount to good reasons to take self-government even further; as 
far, indeed, as full Independence. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
A fundamental underpinning for the stability of any political regime is its legitimacy 
with those over whom that regime is to exercise authority. And that legitimacy is 
perhaps particularly in question when authority is vested in new political structures. 
Devolution to Scotland and Wales has been a very substantial constitutional 
experiment within the United Kingdom; a decade into that experiment, it is important 
to ascertain the extent to which it has attained legitimacy with the people over whom 
a new form of government now functions, and the basis on which public attitudes to it 
are formed. 
 We have seen that self-government for Scotland and Wales not only does not 
face a concerted public challenge; the principle in fact has come to enjoy considerable 
support in both nations. In Scotland, support for a return to the constitutional status 
quo ante has remained low. The challenge to partial self-government there comes now 
not from those wishing to abolish self-government, but those wishing to remove the 
‘partial’ qualifier. In Wales, public attitudes have undergone a substantial, indeed 
dramatic, evolution. Opposition to devolution has fallen considerably, and is now at 
well under half the level witnessed in 1997. Support for an independent Wales has 
not, however, increased to any significant extent. Devolution is increasingly the 
settled will of the Welsh people, even if the exact form of that devolution remains 
distinctly unsettled. 
 The basis for those public attitudes has been established more clearly. Except 
for some generational differences, public attitudes in Scotland and Wales do not 
divide substantially on social lines. Nor, despite the explicit suggestions of many of 
those who campaigned for devolution, are attitudes to it driven by public perceptions 
of the material consequences of devolution. Rather, attitudes are party linked to 
national and partisan identities, but most strongly associated with perceptions of how 
devolution has altered the process of government. Self-government to at least some 
extent has achieved a secure legitimacy in Scotland and Wales. That is has done so 
appears to be largely because, to the people of Scotland and increasingly the people of 
Wales, self-government has come to be viewed as the appropriate political expression 
of how they wish to be governed. 
Table 1: Constitutional Preferences 1997-2007, Scotland and Wales 
A. Scotland 
Constitutional 
Preference 
1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Independence 38.9 28.3 31.1 28.4 31.6 27.4 34.2 37.5 32.6 24.9 
Parliament 33.5 52.7 49.0 55.7 46.4 51.2 42.6 40.9 50.4 57.1 
Assembly 9.5 8.9 7.9 6.0 8.7 7.9 4.9 6.9 7.4 7.9 
No elected body 18.1 10.0 12.0 9.8 13.4 13.6 18.3 14.8 9.6 10.0 
Weighted N 643 1414 1607 1543 1561 1422 1553 1429 1483 1428 
 
B. Wales 
Constitutional 
Preference 
1997 1999 2001 2003 2006 2007 
Independence 14.1 9.6 12.3 13.9 11.5 12.2 
Parliament 19.6 29.9 38.8 37.8 42.1 43.8 
Assembly 26.8 35.3 25.5 27.1 25.0 27.5 
No elected body 39.5 25.3 24.0 21.2 21.3 16.5 
Weighted N 641 1173 1044 935 955 837 
Sources: see Appendix 1 
Table 2: Multinomial Logit Estimates (Robust Standard Errors) for 
Constitutional Preference Model, Scotland (2003) 
 
Variable Assembly Parliament Independence 
Socio-Demographic Variables: 
 
Gender 
 
 
- .17 (.31) 
 
 
.64 (.23)** 
 
 
.20 (.26) 
Age: 
18-24 
 
.18 (.88) 
 
1.23 (.67) 
 
1.24 (.72) 
25-34 .25 (.46) .46 (.36) .46 (.41) 
35-44 .46 (.43) .52 (.33) 1.05 (.37)** 
45-54 .11 (.44) .36 (.33) .55 (.39) 
55-64 - .38 (.44) .18 (.30) .34 (.37) 
Social Class: 
Salariat 
 
.18 (.43) 
 
- .25 (.30) 
 
- .23 (.35) 
Petty Bourgeoisie - .46 (.70) - .23 (.37) .03 (.48) 
Other non-manual 1.35 (.52)** .47 (.38) .49 (.44) 
Foremen etc .75 (.56) .31 (.48) .47 (.52) 
Working Class 
 
.73 (.47) .25 (.33) .87 (.37)* 
Consequentialist Variables: 
Health 
 
- .15 (.36) 
 
.39 (.25) 
 
.38 (.29) 
Education - .59 (.40) - .11 (.24) - .13 (.29) 
Economy 
 
.90 (.46) .25 (.37) .05 (.41) 
Improved Government of UK .86 (.20)*** 1.12 (.16)*** .92 (.19)*** 
Ordinary People More Say In Govt .60 (.25)* .88 (.20)*** 1.16 (.22)*** 
Party ID: 
Conservative 
 
- .34 (.43) 
 
- .39 (.29) 
 
-1.89 (.40)*** 
Labour .66 (.38) .86 (.30)** .01 (.32) 
LibDem .45 (.50) .52 (.36) - .79 (.44) 
SNP .54 (.83) 1.42 (.65)* 1.97 (.66)*** 
Deontological Variables: 
National ID: 
Scot not Brit 
 
 
- .37 (.55) 
 
 
.44 (.44) 
 
 
1.28 (.48)** 
More Scottish - .69 (.51) .18 (.40) - .11 (.46) 
Equal Scot/Brit - .90 (.51) - .54 (.40) -1.61 (.48)** 
More British 
 
- .08 (.73) .22 (.60) -1.36 (.98) 
Intercept 
 
- .61 (.74) .13 (.53) - .31 (.59) 
Initial Log Likelihood = 1651.99 
Model Improvement = 355.28 
Pseudo R2 = .22 
Weighted N = 1413 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
Table 3: Multinomial Logit Estimates (Robust Standard Errors) for 
Constitutional Preference Model, Wales (2003) 
 
Variable Assembly Parliament Independence 
Socio-Demographic Variables: 
 
Gender 
 
 
.00 (.24) 
 
 
.35 (.24) 
 
 
- .07 (.29) 
Age: 
18-24 
 
1.29 (.65)* 
 
1.74 (.60)** 
 
1.85 (.70)** 
25-34 1.21 (.41)** 1.33 (.40)** 1.82 (.47)*** 
35-44 .52 (.34) .46 (.34) .92 (.44)* 
45-54 .30 (.34) .36 (.35) .71 (.46) 
55-64 .40 (.34) .28 (.36) .48 (.45) 
Social Class: 
Salariat 
 
- .19 (.35) 
 
.07 (.35) 
 
-1.03 (.47)* 
Petty Bourgeoisie - .35 (.44) - .18 (.42) - .55 (.52) 
Other non-manual .08 (.36) .38 (.37) - .33 (.46) 
Foremen etc .19 (.47) .31 (.48) - .43 (.58) 
Working Class 
 
.06 (.35) .17 (.34) .08 (.39) 
Consequentialist Variables: 
Health 
 
.35 (.26) 
 
.37 (.27) 
 
- .01 (.35) 
Education .35 (.33) .66(.32)* .35 (.37) 
Economy 
 
.34 (.34) .54 (.37) .90 (.45)* 
Improved Government of UK 1.19 (.20)*** 1.46 (.23)*** 1.55 (.30)*** 
Ordinary People More Say In Govt .86 (.21)*** .76 (.23)** .65 (.27)* 
Party ID: 
Conservative 
 
.47 (.36) 
 
.02 (.36) 
 
-1.14 (.47)* 
Labour .98 (.32)** .65 (.30)* - .24 (.36) 
LibDem 2.04 (.49)*** 1.66 (.47)*** .14 (.64) 
Plaid Cymru 1.93 (.68)** 2.31 (.66)*** 1.95 (.68)** 
Deontological Variables: 
National ID: 
Welsh not British 
 
 
- .11 (.40) 
 
 
.75 (.41) 
 
 
1.24 (.49)** 
More Welsh - .06 (.37) .66 (.38) .09 (.50) 
Equal Welsh/British - .30 (.34) .00 (.36) - .15 (.45) 
More British 
 
- .10 (.44) .40 (.46) - .10 ( .62) 
Intercept 
 
-1.01 (.48)* -1.41 (.50)** -1.28 (.59)*  
Initial Log Likelihood = 1250.44 
Model Improvement = 200.31 
Pseudo R2 = .16 
Weighted N = 943 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
Table 4: Predicted Probabilities of Choosing Constitutional Options, Scotland 
and Wales 2003* 
 
A. Scotland 
 No Devolution Assembly Parliament Independence 
Devolution Improved 
Government? 
    
Improved Lot 
Improved Little 
No Difference 
Little Worse 
Lot Worse 
.01 
.03 
.09 
.22 
.46 
.05 
.06 
.08 
.08 
.08 
.73 
.68 
.60 
.48 
.30 
.21 
.23 
.23 
.22 
.16 
 
Devolution Given People 
More Say? 
    
More Say 
No Difference 
Less Say 
.04 
.09 
.19 
.05 
.08 
.12 
.62 
.62 
.56 
.29 
.20 
.13 
 
B. Wales 
 No Devolution Assembly Parliament Independence 
Devolution Improved 
Government? 
    
Improved Lot 
Improved Little 
No Difference 
Little Worse 
Lot Worse 
.02 
.05 
.17 
.43 
.71 
.25 
.29 
.31 
.26 
.15 
.58 
.51 
.39 
.23 
.10 
.15 
.15 
.12 
.09 
.04 
Devolution Given People 
More Say? 
    
More Say 
No Difference 
Less Say 
.09 
.18 
.33 
.35 
.29 
.23 
.43 
.40 
.33 
.13 
.13 
.11 
*Entries are predicted probabilities for respondents choosing each constitutional preference. 
Probabilities were computed using CLARIFY software in Stata, on the basis of the results obtained in 
Tables 2 and 3. All variables in the multonomial logistic regression models were set to their mean 
values, except for the indicated variables. 
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Appendix 1: Data Sources 
 
Scotland: All data drawn from Scottish Social Attitudes (SSA) surveys. SSA surveys 
have been conducted annually since 1999 by the National Centre for Social Research, 
with initial financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council. 
Fieldwork is conducted face-to-face. (For further details, see: 
http://www.natcen.ac.uk/natcen/pages/or_socialattitudes.htm#ssa) 
 
Wales: Data drawn from the 1997 Welsh Referendum Study; 1999 Welsh National 
Assembly Election Survey; 2001 and 2003 Welsh Life and Times Surveys; a 2006 
survey conducted by GfKNOP for the Electoral Commission; and the 2007 Welsh 
National Assembly Election Study. All studies except 2006 were co-directed by the 
Institute of Welsh Politics (Aberystwyth) and the National Centre for Social Research, 
with fieldwork conducted by the National Centre for Social Research. All surveys 
conducted face-to-face except 1999 (split sample: approximately 50% face-to-face, 
50% telephone) and 2006 (100% telephone). 
 Appendix 2: Variables Used in Multivariate Analysis 
 
Variable Survey Question Codings 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 
Constitutional Preference 
 
 
‘Which of these 
statements comes 
closest to your view?’ 
 
 
No Devolution 
Assembly 
Parliament 
Independence 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
 
Socio-Demographic 
Variables: 
  
Age of Respondent  Age in Years, grouped 
(Reference Category: 18-24 
years old) 
 
Gender 
  
‘0’ male, ‘1’ female 
 
Social Class Categories: 
 
  
‘1’ if member of class 
category, ‘0’ otherwise 
(Reference Category: No 
social class given) 
‘Consequentialist’ Variables:   
 “Would you say that 
since [1999] the 
standard of the health 
service/quality of 
education/standard of 
living in 
Wales/Scotland has 
increased or fallen?” 
“Who do you think 
this has mainly been 
the result of? 
Health 
Education 
Economy 
(Each variable coded‘-1’ if 
respondent according 
responsibility for perceived 
decline to Devolved 
government in any of three 
areas; ‘1’ if respondent 
according responsibility for 
perceived improvement to 
Devolved government in 
any of three areas; ‘0’ 
otherwise) 
 
Improved Government of 
Britain 
 
‘Do you think that so 
far creating the 
[Devolved Institution] 
has improved the way 
Britain as a whole is 
governed, made it 
worse, or has it made 
no difference?’ 
 
‘2’ improved a lot 
‘1’ improved a little 
‘0’ made no difference 
‘-1’ made it a little worse 
‘-2’ made it a lot worse 
   
People More Say ‘From what you have 
seen and heard so far, 
do you think having a 
[Devolved Institution] 
is giving ordinary 
people more say in 
how Scotland/Wales 
is governed, less say, 
or is it making no 
difference? 
 
‘1’ more say 
‘0’ no difference 
‘-1’ less say 
Party Identification ‘Generally speaking, 
do you think of 
yourself as…?’, and 
‘Do you generally 
think of yourself as a 
little closer to one of 
the parties than the 
others?’ 
Labour 
Conservative 
Liberal Democrat 
Plaid Cymru 
(Coded ‘1’ if identifying 
with a party, ‘0’ otherwise)  
‘Deontological’ Variables:   
 
National Identity 
 
‘Which, if any, of the 
following best 
describes how you see 
yourself?’ 
 
‘1’ if choosing identity 
category, ‘0’ otherwise 
(Reference category: 
‘British not 
Scottish/Welsh’) 
 
